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BSC Chrons

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NIO #049-74
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21 January 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : The Shakedown Cruise Key Intelligence Questions


1. Attached are the twelve Key Intelligence Questions my colleagues and I believe are the ones that should be chosen for this concept's trial run and shakedown cruise. These twelve were picked with an eye to their concreteness and, hence, ease of application in testing. They are not necessarily the twelve questions deemed of greatest substantive importance.

2. This list differs from the one given to you on 10 January in two respects:



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b. In our initial proposal, there was one case of overlap which would be certain to create confusion in any test run. KIQ 1-d (under Soviet political dynamics):

"Soviet strategic planning, objectives, and activities re the Middle East and South Asia,"

and KIQ 15-b (under Political and military stability in the Middle East):

"The Soviet role in the Middle East as it affects prospects for and against US peace efforts, i.e., in what ways and on what issues is the USSR exerting its political, economic and military influence on the Arab states,"

are virtually the same question asked in two different ways with two different levels of added detail. We would, therefore, recommend keeping 1-d in the trial list of twelve, but dropping 15-b and substituting for it 15-a:

"Israeli and Arab (especially Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, Saudi and Palestinian) views on and strategies toward the major issues of a peace settlement."

3. If I understood your remarks at the 14 January Executive Committee meeting correctly, you have approved our selection of test questions. If this is indeed accurate, we will consider the attached list as having your blessing and start from there.

George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment

Distribution:

- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - D/DCI/IC
- 1 - DDI
- 1 - DDS&T
- 1 - DDO

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Selected Key Intelligence Questions
for the Initial Test Exercise

Soviet Union/Eastern Europe

- (1) 1. Soviet political dynamics
 - d. Soviet strategic planning, objectives, and activities re the Middle East and South Asia.
- (2) 2. Soviet objectives in arms agreement negotiations
 - c. Soviet intentions and actions with respect to adherence to the ABM Treaty and the SAL Interim Agreement.
- (3) 5. Soviet long range aviation
 - a. The intended size, role and armament of the Backfire force.

Sino-Soviet Relations

- (4) 11. Status of Sino-Soviet relations
 - b. Quantitative and qualitative ways in which the military balance between the Soviet Union and the PRC in the border regions is changing, and any modification of Sino-Soviet tensions, particularly as regards the likelihood of hostilities, which these changes portend.

The People's Republic of China

- (5) 12. PRC relations with the "outside" world
 - c. Identification of the leading candidates to succeed the present leadership and their foreign policy/economic/military views.

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(6) 13. The military import of expanding PRC nuclear capabilities

- b. Status of production and deployment of the Chinese SSBN.

Middle East and Moslem World

- a. Israeli and Arab (especially Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, Saudi and Palestinian) views on and strategies toward the major issues of a peace settlement.

Western Europe/NATO

(8) 16. The US role in Europe and the cohesiveness of NATO

- a. The assessments of important political leaders in Western Europe (and their principal oppositions) as to the US role in Europe.

(9) 17. Political and military stability in Southeast Asia

- b. Evidence of any significant erosion in the position and stability of the Saigon government.

Latin America

(10) 21. Panama Canal negotiations

Panama's intentions and bargaining vulnerabilities in negotiations for a new Canal Treaty or related agreements, and the willingness and ability of the Torrijos government to make concessions.

Energy

(11) 23. The oil problem

- a. Evidence of near-term changes in policies, negotiating positions and vulnerabilities

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of the major foreign petroleum producers with respect to the output, export and price of oil.

Economics

(12) 23. The oil problem

- d. The composition and location of monetary reserves of the major oil producing countries, and movements from one currency to another, particularly with respect to dollars.

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